What Does “Claims against Counties” Mean in an Auto Accident with a County Vehicle?
The Georgia Supreme Court granted review to decide if official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the purported negligent use of a covered motor vehicle are “claims against counties” as that phrase is used in O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1.
Deputy in Clayton County caused the accident
On August 30, 2018, a motorist was driving on State Route 85 in Clayton County when she was involved in an auto accident with a deputy of the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department. The deputy was driving a 2015 Dodge Charger owned by the County. There was no dispute that he was acting in the scope of his official duties as a deputy sheriff at the time of the collision.
The plaintiff filed a renewed complaint pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) against the deputy, Clayton County, and the County Sheriff in Clayton County state court. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the deputy was an improper party pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-92-3 because the statute prohibited claims against a deputy in his individual capacity for torts allegedly committed while he was operating a covered motor vehicle in the performance of his official duties; and that Clayton County was not a proper party. The pertinent portions of O.C.G.A. § 36-92-3 provide:
- Any local government officer or employee who commits a tort involving the use of a covered motor vehicle while in the performance of his or her official duties is not subject to lawsuit or liability therefor. Nothing in this chapter, however, shall be construed to give the local government officer or employee immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the local government officer’s or employee’s conduct was not within the performance of his or her official duties.
- A person bringing an action against a local government entity under the provisions of this chapter shall name as a party defendant the local government entity for which the officer or employee was acting and shall not name the local government officer or employee individually. In the event that the local government officer or employee is individually named for an act for which the local government entity is liable under this chapter, the local government entity for which the local government officer or employee was acting shall be substituted as the party defendant.
The trial court issued granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding:
- The motorist’s claims against the deputy should be dismissed under O.C.G.A. § 36-92-3(a);
- The plaintiff’s claims against the county should be dismissed because the conduct giving rise to her injury was committed by a deputy sheriff, not a county officer or employee; and
- The claims against the sheriff should be dismissed because the plaintiff “failed to present a timely . . . notice to the Sheriff’s office pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1.”
The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of her claims against the Sheriff, vacating the dismissal of her claims against the County, and remanding the case. The plaintiff then filed her petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, which granted her request to address whether § 36-11- 1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle.
The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Georgia Supreme Court held that O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle because such a claim is a claim against the county itself. The text of § 36-11-1 states that “all claims against counties must be presented within 12 months after they accrue or become payable or the same are barred.”
The Supreme Court looked at its previous decisions around the time the statute was enacted in 1860 to see how the statute was then understood. Several cases issued by the Court during that time suggested that bringing claims against the appropriate government officials in their official capacities was a recognized way to proceed against a governmental entity such as the State or a county. In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court observed that “it is difficult to describe in advance every action or suit against an officer or agent of the State that should be classified as an action against the State.”
Thus, in an effort to provide some guidance, the Court explained:
The general rule that is applicable in all cases is that any case, regardless of who are named parties thereto, that could result in a judgment or decree that would in any manner affect or control the property or action of the State, in a manner not prescribed by statute, is a suit against the State.
The Supreme Court expounded upon this rule, noting that “where a suit is brought against an officer or agency of the state” and “the state, while not a party to the record, is the real party against which relief is sought, so that a judgment for the plaintiff . . . will operate to control the action of the state or subject it to liability, the suit is in effect one against the state.”
As the cases demonstrated, the Supreme Court found that by the time the statute was enacted in 1860, it would have been understood that claims against a government could include official capacity claims against at least some of the government’s officials.
“That meaning is to be applied in light of the ensuing precedent, which further developed how and when suing a county official made the claims in that lawsuit qualify as claims against the county itself,” the Court opined. Thus, the statute applies to official capacity claims against county officials, as well.
The general rule also applies to official-capacity claims filed against a county sheriff for losses arising from the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. Sheriffs are county officials, and generally, nothing about a sheriff’s relationship with a county makes him or her different in kind for purposes of applying the general rule, the Court said. Additionally, local government entities- including counties-are subject to liability for losses caused by the “negligence of a local government entity officer or employee using a covered motor vehicle while carrying out his or her official duties or employment,” pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-92-1(a). And “[a] sheriff, deputy sheriff, or other agent, servant, or employee of a sheriff’s office” is defined as a “[l]ocal government officer or employee” for purposes of this statute. Moreover, local governmental entities-including counties-are the ones who provide for the payment of claims, settlements, judgments, and the associated costs arising out of losses caused by covered motor vehicles. And, here, the record showed that the County owned the vehicle the deputy was driving when the motor vehicle accident at issue occurred. Therefore, any “judgment or decree” issued in this case would “affect or control the property or action of” Clayton County and thus was a suit against the County.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for a deputy’s allegedly negligent use of a county-owned vehicle are claims against the county itself. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. Collington v. Clayton County, 2024 Ga. LEXIS 13 (Ga. January 17, 2024).
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