Does the Georgia’s Workers’ Compensation Act Bar an Employee from Suing a Third-Party in the Same Accident?
This appeal stems from an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was driving a vehicle owned by his employer, and the defendant employee was driving a vehicle owned by his employer. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff was judicially estopped from bringing this negligence action due to representations made in the course of settling his workers’ compensation claim against his employer.
Background
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was stopped in traffic while driving his employer’s vehicle, when the defendant employee, who was driving his employer’s vehicle, rear-ended him. The plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim against his insurance company, and the parties entered into a “no liability” settlement, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(b).
The stipulation of settlement memorialized the plaintiff’s position that he “sustained a compensable injury” to his hips, legs, and back due to the accident, which arose out of and within the course of his employment; as well as his employer’s rejection of his position. The stipulation further provided:
In order to avoid litigation in this matter, the parties hereto stipulate and agree that [the plaintiff] did not sustain an accident and injury while employed with [the plaintiff’s employer] and that all compensation benefits should be denied.
The State Board of Workers’ Compensation approved the stipulation, as required by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(b).
A separate release provided that the plaintiff’s employer would pay the plaintiff $45,000 upon the Workers’ Compensation Board’s denial of his claim per the stipulation. The release again referenced the plaintiff’s allegation that he “sustained compensable injuries … arising out of and within the course of” his employment with his employer. And, it declared the parties’ intention to release the plaintiff’s employer “from any and all liability whatsoever arising out of the employment relationship between [it and the plaintiff] under the workers’ compensation laws of the State of Georgia, as well as any other claim that might arise out of the alleged accident” in any action or forum. Upon the Board’s approval of the stipulation, the plaintiff’s employer paid the plaintiff in accordance with the release.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a negligence action against the defendant driver and his employer. The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff was judicially estopped from bringing the negligence action because, in resolving his prior workers’ compensation claim, he stipulated that he hadn’t been injured.
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff was judicially estopped from bringing the present action as a result of his seemingly contradictory representations in his workers’ compensation case. The appeal followed.
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion because it misapplied the judicial estoppel doctrine and misconstrued statutorily-defined terms in his workers’ compensation settlement documents. The Court of Appeals agreed.
The trial court barred the plaintiff’s negligence claims under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which “precludes a party from asserting a position in one judicial proceeding after having successfully asserted a contrary position in a prior proceeding.” Judge Todd Markle of the Court of Appeals wrote that the Supreme Court has explained …
The purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment. This equitable doctrine is invoked by a court at its discretion, and intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process. The circumstances under which it is appropriate are not reduced to any general formula or rule.
Broadly viewed, the question raised in this appeal was whether a “no liability” settlement between an employee and employer under the auspices of the Workers’ Compensation Act bars the employee from then bringing tort claims arising out of the same accident against a third-party tortfeasor. The Court of Appeals said it did not.
The Georgia Supreme Court also has clarified that a settlement with an employer pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15 (b) also bars claims against coworkers acting in their employment capacity.
The Act, itself, contemplates this very scenario, and provides, generally in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) that “no employee shall be deprived of any right to bring an action against any third-party tort-feasor.”
Similarly, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 provides:
When the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this chapter is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability against some person other than the employer, the injured employee … may pursue the remedy by proper action in a court of competent jurisdiction against such other persons.
As such, the applicable statutes expressly permit the plaintiff’s negligence claims, the Court said. Moreover, the underlying purposes of the judicial estoppel doctrine are not met here. As the Court of Appeals explained in an earlier case…
[t]he essential function and justification of judicial estoppel is to prevent the use of intentional self-contradiction as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice. The primary purpose of the doctrine is not to protect the litigants, but to protect the integrity of the judiciary. The doctrine is directed against those who would attempt to manipulate the court system through the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions in judicial proceedings and is designed to prevent parties from making a mockery of justice through inconsistent pleadings.
Because the plaintiff’s negligence claims were permitted by law, the integrity of the judicial system wasn’t compromised, Judge Markle said. Additionally, the Act grants an employer a subrogation right against a remedy recovered from a third-party tortfeasor under certain circumstances; thus, allaying any concerns regarding unfair advantage or double-dipping.
Finally, the trial court construed the stipulation and release too broadly, the Court of Appeals found. Specifically, the trial court said, “In settling his workers’ compensation claim, Plaintiff stipulated that he was not injured in the underlying accident and even asserted he was not involved in an accident while in the course and scope of his employment with the plaintiff’s employer.” To the contrary, both the stipulation and release expressly conceded that the plaintiff alleged he sustained a “compensable injury” due to an accident in the course and scope of employment; and both provide that the relinquishment of his workers’ compensation claims arising from that injury was solely for the purpose of settlement with the plaintiff’s employer under the terms of the Act.
Moreover, the term “injury” is narrowly defined by the Act. In O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) says that as far as a workers’ compensation claim, it “means only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment[.]”
Simply put, these documents didn’t serve as an admission that the plaintiff suffered no injury, nor could they be construed as a waiver of any claims arising from the accident against any party other than his employer.
As a result, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding the judicial estoppel doctrine precluded the present action. The judgment was reversed. Hayes v. KSP Servs., 2024 Ga. App. LEXIS 300, 2024 WL 3271905 (Ga. App. July 2, 2024).
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