Two related cases were brought by the next of kin and administrator for the estate of the deceased against a sports bar seeking damages for wrongful death and personal injuries based on a collision caused by another after he’d been served alcohol by the bar. The bar appealed from the denial of summary judgment in each case, arguing that the trial court erred by ruling that a fact question remained as to its liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 (“the Dram Shop Act”).
Background
In January 2019, the defendant driver and his friend were serving in the U. S. Army and stationed at Fort Stewart. One evening, they decided to go to a bar to play pool. The friend was underage, so he drove the defendant driver to the bar. Upon arrival, the friend’s hand was marked with an “X” to designate him as a non-drinker due to his age. They stayed at the bar for two or three hours, and the defendant driver got “a little drunk.” Some other patrons began arguing with him and he got mad. Eventually, the manager asked them to leave. They driver complied, and at that point, the defendant driver “was definitely a little drunk.” They drove to a second bar, the defendant bar (“The Sports Bar”), and the friend dropped the defendant driver in the parking lot because he wasn’t sure if he’d be admitted due to his age. After learning that the defendant driver’s girlfriend was coming to meet him at the Sports Bar, the friend returned to the barracks.
The defendant driver stayed at the bar and had at least three drinks while he waited about two hours for his girlfriend to arrive. She testified that the defendant driver was “very” drunk and “wobbling when he was walking.” She took his drink from him because she thought he had had too much to drink. Soon after this, the bouncer came over and told the defendant driver that he’d been cut off. The girlfriend replied, “good,” and she said that the defendant driver drank water for the rest of the night, even though he had no recollection of drinking water. He also had no recollection about any conversations with bartenders or servers at the Sports Bar.
For the next hour, the two sat at the bar. The girlfriend testified that the defendant driver was “wobbly,” but laughing and joking with her. “He wasn’t … laid out or … slumped over,” she said. After she returned from the bathroom, he started arguing with her and followed her out to the parking lot. After a few more minutes of arguing, the defendant driver went back inside the bar, and the girlfriend left without him around 1AM.
After he realized that his girlfriend had left, the defendant driver called his underage friend to pick him up. The friend, who was back at the barracks, dressed, drove to the Sports Bar, and met the defendant driver in the parking lot. He then drove the defendant driver back to the barracks, smoked a cigarette with him in the parking lot, and watched as he walked up to his residential building: “I saw him walk over to his module. I made sure he was going in all right and he was good, and I went ahead back to my room and went back to sleep.”
At some point after returning to the barracks, the defendant driver decided to get into his own car and drive to see his girlfriend. After making it to her driveway, he changed his mind and drove back to the barracks without contacting her. On the trip home, while traveling at a high rate of speed, he rear-ended a vehicle with three teenage occupants, the decedent, and two others. He was still intoxicated at the time of the crash.
Based on these events, the plaintiff sued the defendant driver and the Sports Bar, alleging claims for personal injury and wrongful death.
After discovery, the Sports Bar moved for summary judgment in each case, contending that the plaintiffs couldn’t meet their burden to demonstrate liability under Georgia’s Dram Shop Act. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, certifying its ruling for immediate review. The Court of Appeals granted the Sports Bar’s request for review.
The Court of Appeals Reverses
Presiding Judge Sara L. Doyle wrote that on appeal, the Sports Bar argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because the evidence in the record didn’t give rise to a fact question as to whether it knew that the defendant driver would drive soon, as required under the Dram Shop Act.
The Dram Shop Act addresses the potential liability of a person who provides alcohol to someone who then injures another person due to his intoxication. The Act provides, in relevant part:
(a) The General Assembly finds and declares that the consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather than the sale or furnishing or serving of such beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury, including death and property damage, inflicted by an intoxicated person upon himself or upon another person, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section.
(b) A person who sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury, death, or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, including injury or death to other persons; provided, however, a person who … knowingly sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic beverages to a person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication, knowing that such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle, may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such … person when the sale, furnishing, or serving is the proximate cause of such injury or damage.
Based on this, to pursue a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act, Judge Doyle explained that the plaintiff was required to identify evidence demonstrating that the Sports Bar knew that the defendant driver would soon be driving a motor vehicle. “Soon” means “in the near future” or “shortly.” The judge went on to explain:
The Act does not require that the person selling, furnishing, or serving alcohol have actual knowledge that the patron was soon to drive. Rather, if a provider in the exercise of reasonable care should have known both that the recipient of the alcohol was noticeably intoxicated and that the recipient would be driving soon, the provider will be deemed to have knowledge of that fact.
And while constructive knowledge will suffice, providers of alcohol don’t have an affirmative duty to determine how a patron plans to leave their bar and how he or she plans to get home.
Here, the defendant driver didn’t recall any relevant interactions with staff, and there was no evidence that he had keys visible or otherwise represented that he would be driving. To the contrary, it was undisputed that at all times until he returned home from the Sports Bar, he was transported by a designated driver, the underage friend, who drank no alcohol that night.
As to any evidence that the Sports Bar knew the defendant driver was soon to drive, the plaintiffs pointed to two things: (i) a social media post encouraging people to “Come get drunk and give us all your money!”; and (ii) a policy by the Sports Bar stating that its staff were taught, no exceptions, to assume that everyone they were trying to serve that night was going to drive in the near future. With respect to the social media post, despite its hyperbole, it made no reference to driving and wasn’t relevant to knowledge on the part of the Sports Bar regarding the defendant driver’s use of a car.
With respect to the bar’s policy of assuming that patrons would drive, it also didn’t bear on any facts observable by the bar that would be relevant to what it actually knew or should have known about the defendant driver’s decision to drive after he was transported home by his designated driver. The policy didn’t alter the undisputed evidence that the defendant driver drove neither to nor from the bar and that he had no vehicle available to him there. Even if the Sports Bar had asked if he intended to drive himself home—which it wasn’t legally required to do—it would’ve been apparent that the defendant driver had a designated driver throughout his visit to the bar.
In short, the Sports Bar’s policy couldn’t supplant the statutory requirement that the defendant have knowledge that the person will soon be driving when served his last drink. In light of the undisputed evidence that the defendant driver consistently used a designated driver to and from the Sports Bar, and in light of the absence of evidence that the Sports Bar knew or should have known that the defendant driver would decide to drive to his girlfriend’s sometime later after he’d been cut off and safely driven home, the trial court erred by denying summary judgment to the Sports Bar. The judgment was reversed. Sepid, LLC v. Dock, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 72, 2025 WL 584699 (Ga. App. February 24, 2025).
Contact Us
Tobin Injury Law has years of experience with dram shop law and drunk driving cases. Call our law firm at 404-JUSTICE (404-587-8423) or use our online contact form to schedule your free consultation. Our experienced staff will explain the steps in the process of seeking compensation for your injuries in a motor vehicle claim against a bar or other establishment serving alcohol. Our attorneys will help you understand your legal options, and we will fight hard to get you the compensation you need and deserve.