What Does the New Georgia “Offer-to-Settle Statute” Require?
The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed the 2024 amendments to the offer-to-settle statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1.
After a plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with another motorist, the parties entered into settlement negotiations. When the plaintiff later filed suit, the defendant moved to enforce settlement. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to enforce the settlement, and the plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff argued the trial court erred by finding that a binding agreement was reached under § 9-11-67.1 because the defendant’s insurance company failed to comply with the requirements of the statute.
State Farm failed to comply with the conditional terms
In May 2024, the plaintiff was injured when her automobile was struck head-on by a vehicle driven by the defendant. At the time of the accident, the defendant was driving his father’s vehicle, and he was insured under a policy issued by State Farm.
In July 2024, the plaintiff offered to settle her claim against the defendant pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 for the policy limit of $25,000 in exchange for a limited liability release against the defendant. This offer required that, pursuant to § 9-11-67.1(b)(1)(G), State Farm provide to the plaintiff an oral statement by the assigned claims representative before a court reporter authorized to administer oaths regarding whether all liability and casualty insurance coverage provided by State Farm to the defendant has been disclosed. The plaintiff further indicated that failure to provide the oral statement under oath would be considered a counteroffer terminating State Farm’s power of acceptance. The following month, State Farm responded on behalf of the defendant and accepted all material terms of the plaintiff’s offer, specifically indicating it agreed to provide the statement under oath pursuant to § 9-11-67.1(b)(1)(G).
State Farm subsequently delivered the settlement check and a written statement under oath regarding available insurance to the plaintiff’s counsel’s office. The plaintiff’s counsel later returned the check, contending that no binding settlement agreement was reached because State Farm didn’t provide the oral statement under oath.
Next, the plaintiff sued the defendant, who moved to enforce the settlement. He asserted that State Farm, on his behalf, had timely accepted the material terms of the plaintiff’s offer and had complied with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(b)(1)(G) by providing a statement under oath disclosing all applicable liability insurance available. He argued:
- The statute doesn’t require an oral statement under oath;
- A bilateral agreement had been reached; and
- State farm didn’t agree to any additional terms.
The plaintiff responded, arguing :
- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(b)(1)(G) didn’t preclude the plaintiff from requiring an “in-person statement under oath”;
- The statement provided was inadequate; and
- Because State Farm failed to accept the material terms as specified in the offer, it had rejected the offer.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed.
The plaintiff argued the trial court erred by finding the parties reached a binding settlement agreement under § 9-11-67.1 because State Farm failed to accept a material term under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(b)(1)(G) to provide an oral statement under oath regarding disclosure of all insurance coverage.
Analysis of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1
Before reaching the merits of the plaintiff’s argument, Judge Todd Markle noted that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 (amend in July 2024) governs offers to settle claims arising from injuries due to automobile accidents. Under the statute, an offer to settle—
(1) Shall contain the following material terms, which shall be the only material terms: (A) A date by which such offer must be accepted, … ; (B) Amount of monetary payment; (C) The party or parties the claimant or claimants will release if such offer is accepted; (D) For any type of release, whether the release is full or limited and an itemization of what the claimant or claimants will provide to each releasee; (E) The claims to be released; (F) A date by which payment shall be delivered; … and (G) A requirement that in order to settle the claim the recipient shall provide the offeror a statement, under oath, regarding whether [*5] all liability and casualty insurance issued by the recipient that provides coverage or that may provide coverage for the claim at issue has been disclosed to the offeror and a date by which such statement under oath shall be delivered, and such date shall not be less than 40 days from receipt of the offer; provided, however, that the requirement provided in this subparagraph may be waived by the offeror.
The statute further provides that:
(c) Where any offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from a motor vehicle collision provides any term outside of the material terms provided in paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of this Code section, such term shall be construed as an immaterial term that may be mutually agreed to, in writing, by both the offeror and the recipient; provided, however, that a variance by the recipient from such immaterial term shall not subject the recipient to a civil action arising from an alleged failure by the recipient to accept an offer to settle such tort claim if such recipient otherwise complies with subsection (i) of this Code section.
The statute also states that the offer to settle may be accepted by providing written acceptance of the material terms outlined in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(b)(1) in their entirety, and that, although parties may reach a settlement agreement under terms agreeable to both parties, “no party shall require another party, as a condition of settlement, to waive or modify the application of this Code section or any provision of this Code section.”
Here, the plaintiff offered to settle her claim under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 and included the material terms set forth in the statute. In response, State Farm accepted the plaintiff’s offer by agreeing to all material terms. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the plain language of the statute doesn’t require that the statement under oath regarding insurance coverage be an oral statement made before a court reporter. Rather, the statute only requires that the statement be made under oath and be “delivered” to the offeror. Judge Markle concluded that State Farm did just that when it tendered the settlement check and the statement under oath to the plaintiff’s counsel.
Further, the fact that the plaintiff’s offer included a requirement that State Farm provide an oral statement under oath didn’t mean that a binding agreement wasn’t reached when the insurance company didn’t do so. The Code section is clear that the only material terms are those set forth in the statute. And, the plain language of the statute makes it clear that any additional terms are immaterial, and variance from an immaterial term doesn’t result in a rejection of the offer.
Thus, State Farm didn’t agree to any additional terms to settle the claim, and an agreement was reached.
Moreover, the plaintiff can’t require terms more restrictive than the statutory language allows. Judge Markle note that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(b)(1), (c): the terms in subsection (b)(1) “shall be the only terms,” and “any term outside of the material terms provided in paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of this Code section, such term shall be construed as an immaterial term.”
As a result, in providing its written acceptance pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(d) and delivering the settlement proceeds along with a statement that complied with section (b)(1)(G), State Farm did all it was required to do to accept the offer and form a binding settlement agreement.
The Court concluded that a binding contract was formed between the parties and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Torres v. Pineda, 2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 33, 2026 LX 78210 (Ga. App. January 27, 2026).
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