Can an Auto Accident Victim Seek Uninsured Motorist Benefits after Settlement? A Georgia driver appealed the grant of summary judgment against the defendant so that she could pursue uninsured or underinsured motorist (“UM”) benefits under her own insurance policy. The plaintiff settled with the defendant for the limits of his liability insurance policy after an auto accident. She then brought this action to recover uninsured motorist benefits — in reliance on what she describes as a “common law” procedure.
At issue was whether that procedure had been superseded by statute. In 1992, the Georgia General Assembly enacted O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1. Under that statute, a limited release compliant with its requirements preserves a claim for UM benefits. Among those requirements is language releasing the settling carrier. Here, the release executed by the plaintiff didn’t contain that language. The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the procedure the plaintiff used was replaced by statute.
Background of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1(b)(1).
The plaintiff filed this action against the defendant to pursue UM benefits from her own insurer. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the release the plaintiff signed didn’t comply with O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1(b)(1). O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1(b)(1) provides the requirements for a limited release when a motor vehicle accident claim is covered by two or more insurance carriers. The release the plaintiff signed didn’t comply with the statute because it didn’t release the settling carrier from all liability from any claims of the claimant based on injuries to the claimant. That’s what the defendant argued at trial. As such, he argue that there was no basis upon which to maintain the lawsuit against him. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion. As a consequence, the plaintiff filed this appeal.
Georgia courts interpreted the Uninsured Motorist Act
Presiding Judge Christopher J. McFadden wrote that prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1, Georgia courts interpreted the Uninsured Motorist Act to require, as a condition precedent to a suit against the insurance carrier, that the insured first sue and recover a judgment against the uninsured motorist, whether known or unknown. In other words, “a UM carrier was entitled to insist on a judgment in excess of the liability policy limits before fixing coverage under its policy.”
The insurer could waive the condition precedent of insisting on a judgment. So a claimant could maintain an action against his or her own UM insurer after settling with the tortfeasor’s insurer if the UM insurer agreed.
Judge McFadden explained that O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 was enacted “to make meaningful the ability of a claimant to settle with the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier while preserving his UM claim.” Subsection (c) expressly provides that UM policies can’t require permission of the UM carrier before a claimant settles with a liability carrier.
The limited release provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.
Now, a plaintiff can pursue his UM claim if he settles for the limits of the policy as stated in the policy and executes a limited release in accordance with § 33-24-41.1. Both of these requirements must be met before a plaintiff can pursue his UM claims. In Georgia, a claimant who settles with a tortfeasor must execute a limited release pursuant to § 33-24-41.1 to preserve the claimant’s pending claim for UM motorist benefits against his or her own insurance carrier.
The plaintiff didn’t dispute that her release didn’t comply with the statute. But, citing a Court of Appeals opinion, Claxton v. Adams (2020), she argued that compliance with § 33-24-41.1 isn’t mandatory and that her release should be interpreted under common law principles of contract construction. She argued that under the plain language of the release, her claim against the defendant wasn’t barred to the extent that the plaintiff had UM coverage available to cover her claims. The Court disagreed.
Judge McFadden explained that in Claxton, the Court affirmed a trial court’s refusal to enforce a purported settlement agreement. In that case, the plaintiff sent to the defendant’s insurer a demand proposing terms to settle the case. The insurer responded and provided a proposed release that included terms which, according to the insurer, complied with O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1. The plaintiff notified the insurer that he was rejecting what he characterized as a counteroffer.
Here, the Court agreed with the plaintiff that the insurer’s response was a counteroffer because it failed to satisfy the requirements of the plaintiff’s offer. The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that § 33-24-41.1 required her to include in the proposed release certain language to which the plaintiff objected. The Court wrote that the use of a release under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 is optional, and his offer letter never indicated that the release should be or could be issued pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1. But the Court didn’t address the effect of using a release that didn’t comply with O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1, including whether such a release would preserve a claim for UM benefits, because that wasn’t an issue in the case.
On the other hand, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that to preserve a UM claim, a plaintiff must both settle for the limits of the tortfeasor’s insurance policy and execute a limited release in accordance with § 33-24-41.1.
The plaintiff contended that the purpose of filing this action against the defendant was to pursue UM benefits. But she didn’t preserve a claim for UM benefits when she settled with him. And she failed to point to evidence of any other available insurance coverage that was preserved by the language of the release.
As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court didn’t err in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The judgment was affirmed. Barker v. Muschett, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 226, 2025 LX 151100, 2025 WL 1553002 (Ga. App. June 2, 2025).
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