Is a Scout Volunteer on a “Special Mission” When She’s Driving to a Planning Meeting at a Restaurant?
A local council of the Boy Scouts argued on appeal that a trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. The Atlanta Area Council asserted that it couldn’t be held vicariously liable for the negligence of one of its volunteers who was involved in a car crash while en route to a volunteers’ meeting.
Background
That driver was a long-time volunteer with the Boy Scouts organization. In 2020, she was a committee member of the Phoenix District Committee, which is part of the Council, as well as the program camp director for the 2020 scout day camp.
Beginning in late 2019, that driver began working with a Council employee and another volunteer to plan the day camp. On March 5, 2020, she was driving alone in her own car from her home to a restaurant for a meeting to plan the next steps for the camp when she hit the car in front of her. At the time of the collision, she was talking on her personal cell phone to a friend about matters unrelated to the day camp. After the collision, she was issued a warning for following the car in front of her too closely. She admitted that she caused the collision.
The accident victim sued her and the Council, alleging negligence by that driver and seeking to hold the Council vicariously liable based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Council filed a motion for summary judgment, and after a hearing on the motion, the court denied it without explanation. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the Council contended, among other things, that it couldn’t be held vicariously liable for the other driver’ negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Presiding Judge Brian M. Rickman wrote in an opinion for a panel of the Georgia Court of Appeals that two elements must exist to render a master liable under respondeat superior:
- The servant must be in furtherance of the master’s business; and,
- He or she must be acting within the scope of his master’s business.
In other words, the doctrine of respondeat superior holds an employer liable for the negligent or intentional torts of its employee when the tort was done within the scope of the actual transaction of the employer’s business for accomplishing the ends of his employment.
Although the question of whether an employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time of the tort is generally one for the jury, Judge Rickman explained that summary judgment for the employer is appropriate where the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn demonstrate that the employee wasn’t engaged in furtherance of the employer’s business, but was doing a private task. The judge also noted that Georgia appellate courts “have consistently held that an employee acts only for her own purposes—and not for those of her employer—while she is going to or from work.”
As a result, when an employee causes a car accident while driving to or from work, respondeat superior generally doesn’t apply without some showing that the employee was otherwise acting in furtherance of her employer’s business and within the scope of her employment.
In this case, the other driver was driving to a restaurant to attend a scout day camp planning meeting set up by a Council employee. Although she’d never been to that particular restaurant, meetings to plan the day camp were usually held at restaurants. These meeting spots were selected based on location so as to be convenient for the participants.
The other driver wasn’t instructed to take any particular route to the restaurant and used her vehicle’s GPS for directions. At the time of the collision, she wasn’t wearing a Boy Scout uniform. After the collision, the other driver called the Council employee to let her know that she wouldn’t make it to the meeting, which went on without her. Attending meetings like this one was a requirement for maintaining her volunteer position with the Council; however, that driver wasn’t disciplined or reprimanded for her failure to attend the meeting, and she continued her volunteer activities with the Council after missing that meeting.
Although the other driver didn’t have a set meeting place for her volunteer duties with the Council, her travel from her home to the scout day camp planning meeting was similar to a worker traveling to his or her usual place of work. Thus, she was presumed to have been acting only for her own purposes at the time of the crash.
What is the Special Mission Exception?
Judge Rankin noted that the Court of Appeals has recognized an exception to the general rule that an employee traveling to or from work isn’t acting in the course of his or her employment if an employee undertakes a “special mission” at the direction of the employer while commuting to or from work. Under that exception, if an employee, before or after customary working hours, is on his or her way from their home to perform some special service or to undertake a duty incidental to the nature of their employment in the interest of, or under direction of, his or her employer, and an injury arises en route from the home to the place where the work is performed—that injury is considered as arising out of and in the course of the employment.
For this exception to apply, the mission “must be made at the employer’s request or direction” and must be “special” or “uncustomary.”
In this case, Judge Rickman said that although the Council employee set up the March 5th meeting, the scout camp planning group usually met at restaurants, and the other driver’s trip from her home to the restaurant that day couldn’t be characterized as “special or uncustomary” such that it would fall outside the general rule.
As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the Council’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims against the Council based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Atlanta Area Council, Inc. v. Patel, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 52 (Ga. App. February 13, 2025).
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