Georgia’s Sudden Emergency Defense

What is Sudden Emergency Defense in an Auto Accident Case?

An auto accident victim sued two other motorists for damages allegedly sustained in a three-motor-vehicle collision. She claimed that the two other drivers negligently caused the collision. The second driver raised the sudden emergency defense, but the first didn’t. The trial court instructed the jury on that defense as to only the first driver. The jury returned verdicts in favor of both defendants.

Verdicts and Fault

The plaintiff alleged that she was driving her vehicle on an interstate highway when she had to stop suddenly for a car in front of her. She said that the first driver was following her too closely in his vehicle and struck her. The second driver was following the first driver too closely in his vehicle and hit the back of the first driver’s vehicle, causing his vehicle to strike the plaintiff’s. Both the first and second drivers answered the complaint; however, only the second driver asserted the affirmative defense of sudden emergency.

The case proceeded to a jury trial, during which the judge, over the plaintiff’s objections, allowed the second driver to argue his sudden emergency defense to the jury and gave a jury instruction on that defense. The jury returned separate verdicts in favor of both the first and second drivers, finding separately that neither was negligent. The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts. The plaintiff, who didn’t move for a new trial, appealed from that final judgment.

The plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the second driver’s affirmative defense of sudden emergency because the evidence didn’t authorize such a jury instruction. Moreover, the error wasn’t harmless since it gave the second driver a defense to which he wasn’t entitled.

What is the Sudden Emergency Doctrine?

Georgia law says that if a defendant is confronted with a sudden emergency without sufficient time to determine with certainty the best course to pursue, he’s not held to the same accuracy of judgment as would be required of him if he had time for deliberation. The sudden emergency defense is available where the evidence shows that there’s been a sudden peril caused by circumstances in which the defendant didn’t participate and that offered him a choice of conduct without time for thought. Thus, application of the sudden emergency doctrine requires that the defendant have a choice of conduct. To that end, a 2011 decision said:

The sudden emergency defense is not available unless the evidence shows that the sudden peril offered the defendant a choice of conduct without time for thought, so that any negligence in the defendant’s choice may be attributed to lack of time to assess the situation rather than lack of due care. The doctrine requires that the person confronted by the emergency have the opportunity to exercise one of several reasonable alternative courses of action. In the absence of such factors, there can be no conduct to which to apply the standard and the doctrine is inapplicable.

Reasonable Alternative Choices Available?

Presiding Judge Christopher J. McFadden of the Georgia Court of Appeals found that in this case, there was no evidence that the second driver had an opportunity to exercise one of several reasonable alternative courses of conduct prior to the collision. Rather, the evidence established that his only course of conduct was to try to stop. He testified that because of heavy traffic in the lanes on both sides of him he “had no areas to maneuver to change lanes,” that he “had no way to change lanes or move … over,” that “it was not a reasonable choice for him to get over to the left or right,” and that his only course of conduct was to “slam on his brakes” to stop his vehicle.

Thus, the second driver didn’t argue he had a choice between attempting to stop and taking some other action. The main point of his argument wasn’t that he made an emergency choice when confronted by a sudden danger, but rather that he wasn’t negligent. As such, the collision, as to him, was an accident or due to the negligence of others.

Under these circumstances, the charge on sudden emergency was given in error because under the evidence there was no real choice of conduct open to the second driver after he realized the situation.

Earlier decisions said a trial court committed reversible error in giving jury instruction on sudden emergency where there was no evidence of a “real choice of conduct open to the defendant because he didn’t contend that he had a choice between attempting to stop and attempting to pass on either side, and the sudden emergency defense not applicable in rear-end collision case where the evidence showed that the defendant could not have “pass[ed] on the left, and the defendant did not contend that he had a choice between attempting to stop and attempting to pass on the right.”

Judge McFadden concluded that under the circumstances in this case, it was error for the trial court to give the sudden emergency jury charge. The instruction gave a defense to which the second driver wasn’t entitled, and the error therefore wasn’t harmless. As a result, the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial against the second driver.

The plaintiff claimed that as to the second driver’s sudden emergency defense, and the Court’s reversal of the judgment as to that driver, didn’t impact the verdict and judgment entered in favor of the first driver. But the first driver didn’t assert a defense of sudden emergency in his answer; he didn’t request a jury instruction on sudden emergency or join in the second driver’ request for that instruction; and he made no sudden emergency argument to the jury.

Likewise, the plaintiff’s closing argument didn’t mention the sudden emergency doctrine as to the first driver, and instead discussed it only as a defense raised by the second driver. Moreover, the trial court’s jury instruction on the sudden emergency defense identified only the second driver and its applicability to him, but gave no indication that it had any applicability to the first driver.

Judge McFadden explained that it’s well settled that where several defendants are sued, and a several verdict is rendered, a new trial as to one defendant won’t disturb the other.

Because the plaintiff didn’t raise any claim on appeal that would affect the judgment entered for the first driver, the Court of Appeals wouldn’t disturb it in this appeal. As a result, the judgment was reversed in part. The instruction on the sudden emergency defense was error because the second driver wasn’t faced with a choice of conduct. The Court of Appeals reversed the verdict and judgment in favor of the second driver. Rice v. Francis, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 37 (Ga. App. February 4, 2025).

Here to help

Having a knowledgeable Atlanta personal injury lawyer Atlanta residents trust who has extensive experience in handling auto accident cases every day really does make a difference. Whomever you hire as your personal injury car accident lawyer must understand Georgia law and how to apply our state’s personal injury laws effectively.  Our experienced Atlanta based personal injury law firm is happy to answer your questions. We offer free consultations to all prospective clients. Contact an Atlanta personal injury attorney Atlanta residents trust at Tobin Injury Law 24 hours a day, seven days a week by calling 404-JUSTICE (404-587-8423).