Are Rideshare Vehicles Included in the Georgia Motor Carrier Act?
A plaintiff appealed from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment to State Farm, the insurance company providing liability coverage to Lyft.
The only issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in determining that Lyft wasn’t a motor carrier as defined by the Georgia Motor Carrier Act and that State Farm, as its liability insurance provider, therefore couldn’t be directly named as a defendant in the lawsuit.
Background
The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision with another vehicle in June 2020. At the time, the other driver was operating his vehicle as a driver for Lyft. In May 2022, the plaintiff sued the other driver, Lyft, and State Farm as Lyft’s insurance provider. State Farm argued that Lyft wasn’t a motor carrier as defined by Georgia law, and, therefore, State Farm couldn’t be joined directly in the lawsuit.
The trial court granted State Farm’s motion, and the plaintiff’s appeal followed.
The Court of Appeals Reverses
Judge Kenneth B. Hodges III wrote for the Court of Appeals that the general rule in Georgia is that “a party may not bring a direct action against the liability insurer of the party who allegedly caused the damage unless there is an unsatisfied judgment against the insured or it is specifically permitted either by statute or a provision in the policy.” But the judge noted that there are exceptions to this general rule. For example, in cases brought against “motor carriers,” Georgia law permits direct actions against liability insurance companies.
The purpose of permitting joinder of an insurance company in a claim against a motor carrier is to further the policy of the Motor Carrier Act, that is, to protect the public against injuries caused by the motor carrier’s negligence. Additionally, it enables injured persons to recover compensation more efficiently and quickly and encourages insurers to resolve legitimate claims by settlement.
The plaintiff’s only contention on appeal was that the trial court erred in determining that Lyft wasn’t a motor carrier as defined by the Georgia Motor Carrier Act and, therefore, in dismissing her direct action against Lyft’s liability insurer. Citing a 2013 decision, the judge wrote:
When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. … Applying these principles, if the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.
The Georgia Motor Carrier Act
Part 2 of the Georgia Motor Carrier Act defines a “motor carrier” as”
[e]very person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any motor vehicle, including the lessees, receivers, or trustees of such persons or receivers appointed by any court, used in the business of transporting for hire persons, household goods, or property or engaged in the activity of nonconsensual towing pursuant to Code Section 44-1-13 for hire over any public highway in this state.
But the Act exempts a number of vehicles that would otherwise fall under the definition of “motor carrier,” including certain taxicabs and limousine carriers. Insurance carriers may not be joined in the same action for these exempted vehicles. The burden of proving that a party is exempt from the Motor Carrier Act lies with the party claiming the exemption, and there’s no burden on the opposing party to prove that a vehicle isn’t within the exemption.
In 2015, the Georgia General Assembly amended the Act to include Part 4, which encompasses O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-190 through 40-1-200, addressing “Ride Share Network Services and Transportation Referral Services.” The parties didn’t dispute that Lyft is a “ride share network service” as defined in O.C.G.A. § 40-1-190(4):
“Ride share network service” means any person or entity that uses a digital network or Internet network to connect passengers to ride share drivers for the purpose of prearranged transportation for hire or for donation. The term “ride share network service” shall not include any corporate sponsored vanpool or exempt rideshare as such terms are defined in Code Section 40-1-100, provided that such corporate sponsored vanpool or exempt rideshare is not operated for the purpose of generating a profit.
Part 4 defines a “ride share driver” as “an individual who uses his or her personal passenger car, as defined in § 40-1-1(41) to provide transportation for passengers arranged through a ride share network service.” That Part doesn’t include any reference to whether ride share network services are motor carriers, to liability, or to direct actions by liability insurers, the judge noted.
State Farm argued that ride share network services like Lyft aren’t subject to the § 40-1-100 12)(A) definition of motor carrier and, therefore, § 40-1-112(c), permitting direct actions against a motor carrier’s liability insurance carrier, doesn’t apply. State Farm pointed to language in § 40-1-112 (c) that specifically limits naming the insurance company as a defendant to “a cause of action arising under this part[,]” which is Part 2. As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals disagreed with State Farm’s assertion that ride share network services like Lyft are governed only by Part 4 of the Motor Carrier Act, and not Part 2.
The judge explained that the General Assembly enacted Part 4 of the Motor Carrier Act to “provide uniform administration and parity among ride share network services, transportation referral services, and transportation referral service providers, including taxi services that operate in this state for the safety and protection of the public.” But that language doesn’t declare that rideshare network services are not motor carriers as defined by O.C.G.A. § 40-1-100(12)(A) of the Georgia Motor Carrier Act, nor does it exempt these companies from the Act’s definition of motor carrier. It simply preempts the field of administration and regulation for certain types of transportation services to the extent that the rules are different from other portions of the Motor Carrier Act, as the General Assembly did for limousine carriers in Part 3 of the Act.
Judge Hodges explained that the definition of “motor carrier” in O.C.G.A. § 40-1-100(12)(A) is broad enough to include ride share network services. And if the General Assembly wanted to exempt ride share network services like Lyft from the definition of motor carrier, it could have included such vehicles in the list of exemptions in § 40-1-100(12)(B), as it did for certain taxicabs and limousines, when it added Part 4 to the Motor Carrier Act. But it didn’t, despite the fact that Part 4 references taxicabs and other Parts of the Motor Carrier Act.
Because the Motor Carrier Act enumerates exceptions to the definition of motor carrier, the Court of Appeals presumed that the General Assembly clearly expressed all the exceptions it intended, and the it wouldn’t read further exceptions into the statute due to the canon of expressio unius. That canon posits that the listing of enumerated exceptions in an Act implies the exclusion of other exceptions:
Under the statutory interpretation doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, where the General Assembly includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that the General Assembly acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.
As such, the General Assembly’s decision not to list ride share network services in the list of exceptions implied a deliberate choice to include them within the definition of motor carrier, the Court concluded. The Court of Appeals held that ride share network services like Lyft are clearly engaged in “the business of transporting for hire persons” over the public highways in the State of Georgia, and, as such, fall within the definition of a motor carrier in Part 2 of the Georgia Motor Carrier Act.
In addition, applying the doctrine of expressio unius, the Court further concluded that ride share network services like Lyft are not exempt from the Act’s definition of motor carrier. Because State Farm didn’t meet its burden of proving that Lyft is exempt from the Motor Carrier Act’s definition of motor carrier, it was proper for the plaintiff here to directly name State Farm, as Lyft’s liability insurance provider, in her lawsuit under the version of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c) applicable both when the incident occurred in June 2020 and when she filed her lawsuit in May 2022.
As such, the trial court erred in finding otherwise and in granting summary judgment to State Farm. The judgment was reversed. Barnes v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 2024 Ga. App. LEXIS 345, 2024 WL 3933619 (Ga. App. August 26, 2024).
Seek Advice from an Experienced Personal Injury Lawyer
Having a knowledgeable rideshare accident lawyer who has experience handling these types of accident cases does matter. Whoever you hire as your rideshare accident lawyer needs to know the law and how to apply it. We’re happy to answer your questions. We offer free consultations to all prospective clients. Contact an Atlanta personal injury attorney at Tobin Injury Law 24 hours a day, 7 days a week by calling 404-JUSTICE (404-587-8423).