Guess what!? We have an Allstate Allstar case, again. The plaintiffs appealed from a trial court’s dismissal of their action against Allstate Insurance Company for breach of contract, bad faith, and other claims, all arising out of a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured motorist and Allstate’s failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits.
Car Crash with Allstate
On March 26, 2021, the plaintiff was driving a Nissan Maxima with his wife as a passenger when their vehicle was rear-ended by a Honda Civic driven by the defendant. The plaintiffs sued the defendant and her parents for negligence on March 25, 2023, and on or about August 2, 2024, the plaintiffs mailed a copy of the summons and complaint in that suit to Allstate, with whom the plaintiffs allege they had a valid insurance agreement.
However, on November 20, 2024, the trial court dismissed the defendant and her parents without prejudice but allowed the case to remain active for resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims against the uninsured motorist carrier (Allstate).
After that dismissal, on February 5, 2025, the plaintiffs sent an uninsured motorist settlement demand to Allstate with their medical records and bills, to which Allstate responded, indicating that it would review and evaluate the demand. A month later, Allstate made a counteroffer in response to the plaintiffs’ demand.
The plaintiffs then filed this action against Allstate on May 13, 2025, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, bad faith, and unfair trade practices, all of which premised Allstate’s liability on its failure to pay the plaintiffs pursuant to their uninsured motorist coverage. Allstate moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the condition precedent to recovery of uninsured motorist benefits under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)—namely, a judgment against the uninsured motorist that found the tortfeasor liable for the plaintiffs’ damages. The trial court granted the motion after a hearing, and this appeal followed.
The Court of Appeals Evaluates the Uninsured Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11
The plaintiffs claimed that the trial court erred in requiring a judgment against an uninsured motorist as a condition precedent to an uninsured motorist carrier’s duty to pay an uninsured motorist’s contractual claim, and by inappropriately resolving the factual matter of the absence of a judgment against the uninsured motorist at the pleading stage. More specifically, they argued that they needn’t obtain a judgment against the uninsured tortfeasor in order to state a claim for breach of contract against their uninsured motorist carrier (“UMC”) because—according to them—under the Uninsured Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11, the uninsured motorist carrier has a duty to evaluate and pay a valid uninsured motorist claim within 60 days of the insured’s demand.
Judge J. Wade Padgett wrote that under Georgia’s Uninsured Motorist Act, it’s well settled that an injured party first must establish that the driver of the uninsured vehicle is legally liable to him or her for the accident before recovery is allowed under uninsured motorist coverage. Indeed, where the injured party seeks to recover uninsured motorist benefits under a contract of insurance with his or her UMC, liability in the underlying motor vehicle accident has to be litigated prior to litigating the contract claim. And where an injured party also asserts a claim for bad faith against his or her UMC, Judge Padgett explained that such a claim must be filed in a separate action after the injured party has obtained a judgment against the uninsured tortfeasor.
Thus, regardless of how an injured party characterizes his or her claims against an uninsured motorist carrier, where that party seeks uninsured motorist benefits under the contract of insurance with the uninsured motorist carrier and/or bad faith penalties or any other recovery based on the UMC’s failure to pay those benefits, it’s a condition precedent to an action against an uninsured motorist carrier that suit shall have been brought and judgment recovered against the uninsured motorist. Stated otherwise, unless and until the insured has secured a judgment against the uninsured motorist showing that he’s legally entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist, the insured has no claim against his uninsured motorist carrier for uninsured motorist benefits.
The plaintiffs conceded in their briefing that their bad faith claim against Allstate requires a judgment against the uninsured tortfeasor as a condition precedent to asserting such a claim, but argued that their claim for breach of contract and related causes of action are exempt from this well-settled requirement. Relying on the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Lewis v. Cherokee Ins. Co. (1989), they argued that their allegations of: (1) injuries arising from a collision with an uninsured motorist; (2) a demand for payment to their UMC; (3) and their UMC’s failure to pay the amount they demanded, are alone sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract and related causes of action. However, the Court found that their argument were inconsistent with Georgia law.
Contrary to their argument, Judge Padgett explained that the Court of Appeals has long held that under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(j), a demand for payment and refusal by the insurer to pay the amount of the demand before trial on the tort liability of the uninsured motorist doesn’t eliminate the requirement that a judgment first be obtained against the uninsured motorist as a condition precedent to suit against the insurer. Indeed, an insurer doesn’t have a duty to accept an insured’s demand for payment of a claim[under the policy’s uninsured motorist coverage prior to judgment being entered against an uninsured motorist. As such, the plaintiffs fundamentally misunderstood and misstated the functional effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis. As the Court of Appeals explained in a 1991 decision:
The issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Lewis … was whether an insured could make a valid demand for payment of uninsured motorist benefits within the contemplation of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(j), so as to start the running of the 60-day period, without first obtaining a judgment against the uninsured motorist. The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative, stating: “It is clear that a plaintiff must obtain a judgment against the uninsured motorist before filing suit against an insurer for [here,] the bad-faith penalty and attorney fees. However, it does not follow that a judgment against the uninsured motorist is a prerequisite for a demand against an insurer under this section.” It is thus clear that the Supreme Court did not intend in Lewis to change the long-established rule that “[i]t is a condition precedent to an action against an automobile liability insurance carrier to recover under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 on account of injuries and damages to the plaintiff resulting from the negligence of a known uninsured motorist, that suit shall have been brought and judgment recovered against the uninsured motorist.”
Stated otherwise, a demand for payment under a policy’s uninsured motorist coverage simply triggers the 60-day bad faith clock under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(j), such that in the event the insured secures an applicable judgment against the uninsured motorist—thereby establishing the UMC’s contractual liability—the insured may file a separate action in which the question of bad faith is addressed. A demand for payment in no way invalidates the requirement that the uninsured motorist’s tort liability be established by way of judgment before a UMC can be held accountable on its contractual obligation to its insured.
“The statute’s 60-day period for paying a valid claim and its potential for a bad faith penalty simply incentivizes both good, efficient practices in handling uninsured motorist claims, and judicial economy,” Judge Padgett opined.
Where an insured makes a prejudgment claim, and the uninsured driver’s liability is clear or even arguable, the uninsured motorist carrier may foreclose the potential for a bad faith penalty by paying the claim and becoming subrogated to the rights of the insured, pending the outcome of the insured’s tort action against the uninsured motorist. Conversely, should the UMC choose not to pay an insured’s prejudgment demand and the insured’s judgment against the uninsured motorist establishes the validity of his demand, the uninsured motorist carrier risks additional liability, determined in a subsequent suit, for bad faith and attorney fees. The latter subsection doesn’t, itself, create a cause of action for breach of contract or breach of any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Thus, whether denominated as contract-based, bad faith, or deceptive trade practices, the central element to each claim in this case was Allstate’s alleged duty to pay, which, under longstanding Georgia law, can only be established by an antecedent judgment finding the uninsured motorist responsible for the plaintiffs’ damages. And where, as here, it appeared from the face of the complaint that this condition precedent to bringing the suit hadn’t been satisfied, the complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint based upon their failure to satisfy the condition precedent to bringing suit: a judgment against an uninsured motorist tortfeasor. The trial court judgment was affirmed. Woods v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 440 *; 2026 LX 545254; 2026 WL 2728807 (Ga. App. September 16, 2026).
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