The Level of Knowledge Needed to Find Homeowners Liable

What Knowledge is Required to Find Homeowners Liable?

In this appeal, the plaintiff sought review of the trial court’s order granting a directed verdict to the homeowners. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by finding that the defendants had no actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard that caused the plaintiff’s fall.

The injured person was an invitee in a home

On August 20, 2015, the plaintiff was an invitee in the defendants’ home, caring for their two-year-old son while the defendants were at work. Before August 20, 2015, the defendants had experienced water leaking into their home from their roof. Sometimes when it rained, the roof would leak and cause puddles, but not always in the same place and not every time it rained. Depending on how much it rained, the defendants sometimes used pots to collect the water. The defendants, who were renters, contacted the owners, and the property management company “numerous” times to complain about the leaking roof, but it was never repaired. When the defendants left for work the morning of August 20, 2015, it was sunny, and there was no water on the dining room floor. Sometime that afternoon, it rained, and the plaintiff, who was still in the home caring for the defendants’ child, slipped on a puddle of water that had pooled in the defendants’ dining room and injured her leg.

The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking relief from the defendants alleging they were negligent in failing to warn the plaintiff of the hazardous condition. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and after the plaintiff rested her case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict arguing the plaintiff failed to meet her burden that the defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard that caused the plaintiff’s injuries such that they were required to warn her. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion. This appeal followed.

Constructive knowledge compared to actual knowledge of a condition 

Judge Jeff Davis and a panel of the Georgia Court of Appeals first turned to the plaintiff’s arguments that the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for directed verdict because the trial court incorrectly found the defendants had no actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard that caused the plaintiff’s injury.

A motion for a directed verdict may be made at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent … If there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict, such verdict shall be directed.

An owner or occupier of land is liable when he fails to warn his invitees of dangers or defects of which he knew or should have known had he exercised ordinary care. To recover for a slip or trip and fall, the plaintiff must prove:

  • That the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the foreign substance; and
  • That the plaintiff must also show that he was without knowledge of its presence and that the invitee must exercise ordinary care for his own safety.

In assessing the relative knowledge of the parties, the question is whether they were accurately informed about the specific hazard or danger in question.

Did the Plaintiff Prove that the Defendants Had Actual Knowledge?

The plaintiff argued the defendants had actual knowledge of the hazard because they had actual knowledge of the recurring hazard of rainwater pooling on the dining room floor when it rained. But Judge Davis noted that Georgia law is clear that a defendant’s knowledge of generally prevailing hazardous conditions isn’t enough to establish actual knowledge of the specific hazard that caused the slip and fall. While the evidence showed the defendants were aware that their roof leaked (that sometimes caused water to pool in various places throughout their home, including on the dining room floor), they weren’t aware of the specific hazard that caused the plaintiff to fall, which was the puddled water on the dining room floor that afternoon. When the defendants left for work that morning, it was sunny, there was no water on the dining room floor, and the defendants didn’t have any opportunity after that to return home to see if there was water present. The defendants additionally testified that their roof didn’t leak every time it rained. When it did leak, there were several leaks throughout the house, and water wouldn’t always pool on the dining room floor. It was random. Sometimes when it rained, water would accumulate in the basement, the master bedroom, and closets. Sometimes, based on the amount of rain, the defendants would put pots down to collect the water where it was leaking. Whether the roof would leak or cause water to puddle in their house “was random” and depended on “too many variables.”

Accordingly, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence didn’t support the plaintiff’s claim that through their actual knowledge of a “pervasive hazard” (i.e., their leaky roof), the defendants had actual knowledge of the specific hazard, the puddle on the dining room floor, that caused the plaintiff’s fall.

Did the Plaintiff Prove that the Defendants Had Constructive Knowledge?

The plaintiff also argued the defendants had constructive knowledge of the hazard which caused her to fall because they were aware that the leaky roof could cause water to puddle in certain areas of their home. Again, the Court disagreed.

Georgia law doesn’t recognize constructive knowledge of a specific hazard through knowledge of pervasive hazardous conditions, Judge Davis explained. Rather, Georgia law provides that constructive knowledge can be shown by evidence that the defendants’ failure to discover the hazard resulted from a failure to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the premises.”

Here, the evidence presented didn’t show that the defendants had constructive knowledge of the pooling water in their dining room through a failure to exercise reasonable care. The testimony was consistent that there was no water on the floor when they left for work. Thus, the defendants’ failure to discover the pooled water in their dining room wasn’t due to a failure to inspect because any ordinary diligence by the defendants wouldn’t have discovered the hazard. As a consequence, under Georgia law, the plaintiff didn’t present enough evidence to show that the defendants had constructive knowledge of the hazard.

Because the plaintiff couldn’t show that the defendants had either actual or constructive knowledge of the pooled water in their dining room, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court didn’t err in granting the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict.

A jury will normally decide if an owner has exercised ordinary care in keeping the premises safe for those invited on the property, except in obvious situations where reasonable minds couldn’t differ as to the conclusions to be reached, Judge David explained. The law only requires such diligence toward making the premises safe as the ordinarily prudent person in such matters is accustomed to use. Here, the evidence showed that the defendants discharged the duty of ordinary care to the plaintiff, leaving no room for reasonable minds to differ. As such, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of directed verdict to the defendants. Adams v. Lee, 2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 425 *; 2026 LX 443968; 2026 WL 2590450 (Ga. App. September 2, 2026).

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