How is a Limited Release Applied to an Accidental Gunshot Incident in a Vehicle?
This personal injury action came before the Court of Appeals a second time. The plaintiff was injured when a 15-year-old accidentally shot him in the leg while the two were in a truck owned by the teen’s father. The plaintiff sued the teen, his father, and the father’s company (LLC) to recover for his injuries. In the first appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the company. The trial court later granted summary judgment to the teen and his father based on a limited release signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed from that order, arguing that the defendants weren’t entitled to summary judgment because they failed to show that a condition of the release — that no other insurance policy covered the plaintiff’s injuries — was satisfied.
Background
On Sunday, June 28, 2020, an individual (Jones) who sometimes did odd jobs for the teen’s father asked him if he could borrow his lawnmower to cut the grass at his place. The father agreed. Neither the father nor his company had any ownership interest in Jones’s house, and the truck used to transport the lawnmower was owned by the teen’s father, not the LLC. No money was exchanged.
Before getting into the truck driven by Jones and occupied by the plaintiff, the teen took a 9-millimeter pistol from his father’s dresser drawer, hid it in his waistband, and pulled his shirt over it. The teen’s father had previously told his son not to use the gun except for “home defense” or if he gave him permission to practice shooting. The plaintiff provided no evidence that the LLC owned the pistol or that the teen’s father commingled his personal funds with the LLC’s. While the young men were returning to Jones’s trailer in the blue truck, the teen accidentally shot the plaintiff in the leg, eventually resulting in its amputation.
The plaintiff sued the teen, the teen’s father, and the LLC, alleging that the teen’s father was negligent for furnishing the gun to the teen and that the LLC was liable as “a mere instrumentality and alter ego for the transaction of the teen’s father’s affairs.” Five months later, the plaintiff executed a limited release agreeing to relinquish all claims against the teen and the teen’s father arising from the incident in exchange for an insurance payout, except to the extent other insurance coverage is available that covers the plaintiff’s claims. Later, while discovery was still pending, the teen and his father filed a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff released his claims against them. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that he hadn’t yet received complete information about all insurance policies available to the defendants. The trial court denied the motion, but ruled that the teen and his father could refile the motion as one for summary judgment after discovery was completed.
The LLC moved for summary judgment, asserting that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to its responsibility for the incident, and the plaintiff sought partial summary judgment on the unqualified existence of an agency relationship between the teen’s father and the LLC. The trial court granted the LLC’s motion and denied the plaintiff’s.
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the LLC wasn’t entitled to summary judgment because the teen’s father and the LLC were “one in the same.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings, pointing to a lack of evidence that the teen’s father commingled his personal funds with those of the LLC, that the LLC owned any of the instrumentalities or properties at issue, that the young men in the truck were employees of the LLC or acted in furtherance of its interests, or that any negligence by the teen’s father or the occupants of the truck was imputable to the LLC.
The teen and his father subsequently filed a renewed motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, again citing the plaintiff’s release and contending that no other insurance coverage was available to cover his claims against them. The defendants acknowledged that the LLC had several other insurance policies, including a commercial auto policy from Home-Owners Insurance Company, but they maintained that those policies weren’t applicable because the LLC, having been awarded summary judgment, was no longer a party to the case. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the LLC’s commercial auto policy provided coverage and that the LLC should be “restored as a party.” The trial court granted the defendant’s motion without explaining its reasoning and awarded attorney fees to defense counsel under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68. The plaintiff appealed.
Court of Appeals Reverses
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants under the limited release because the LLC’s commercial auto policy may provide additional insurance coverage for his injuries. The plaintiff contended that the Court’s 2025 decision in Harvey v. Hall controlled this case and required reversal of the trial court’s order.
Court of Appeals Judge Jeffrey A. Watkins explained that in Harvey, a passenger in a truck was injured when the driver fell asleep and crashed into a culvert. The passenger signed a limited release like the one in this case, insulating the driver, his employer, and his employer’s insurance company from liability “except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers the claim.” The passenger then sent demand letters to two of the employer’s other insurance companies, both of which denied coverage. Later, the passenger sued the driver and the employer, who both sought summary judgment on the basis that “the limited release [the passenger] signed released them from liability while allowing him to pursue other available insurance coverage — and no such coverage existed.” The trial court denied the defendants’ motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed because the passenger failed to present evidence of additional insurance coverage.
The Court of Appeals held that a defendant seeking summary judgment based on an affirmative defense, such as a release, must present evidence “which establishes the prima facie affirmative defense,” after which the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence creating a jury issue on an element of the defense. If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Harvey defendants carried their burden of proof in support of their affirmative defense by presenting the release and the written denials of coverage from the employer’s other insurers. The burden thus shifted to the passenger to present evidence that the incident was, in fact, covered by the other policies; however, the passenger failed to carry that burden. Consequently, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
Applying Harvey to the facts of this case, Judge Watkins found that the defendants presented evidence of the plaintiff’s limited release insulating them and their insurance company from liability except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers the claim or claims of the plaintiff. They also presented evidence of several other insurance policies held by the LLC, including the commercial auto policy issued by Home-Owners, which they said didn’t apply because the LLC was no longer a party to this lawsuit. The plaintiff contended that the defendants didn’t meet their initial burden of proof as to the commercial auto policy because they didn’t present evidence, such as coverage denial letters, affidavits from the insurer, or “sworn testimony that coverage had been denied.
To resolve this issue, the Court looked at the terms of the commercial auto policy. As the defendants pointed out, the policy named the LLC as the insured. It was undisputed that the policy listed two covered vehicles: neither of which was the truck in which the plaintiff was shot; and three covered drivers, none of whom was the driver or the shooter. As such, the defendants maintained that the policy plainly didn’t apply here.
But the plaintiff pointed to other policy provisions suggesting that coverage may be broader than the defendants claimed. The policy stated that Home-Owners will pay “all sums an insured legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury … to which this insurance applies, caused by an accident and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto as an auto.” In addition to the two listed vehicles, the policy also covered:
“non-owned autos,” which were defined as “autos [the named insured] do[es] not own … that are used in connection with [the named insured’s] business. This includes autos owned by … members (if [the named insured is] a limited liability company), but only while used in [the named insured’s] business or … personal affairs.”
It was undisputed that the teen’s father owned the truck at issue and he father was a member of the LLC. He loaned the truck to Jones to transport a lawnmower for Jones’s use. Whether this happened in a “non-owned auto” used for the LLC’s “personal affairs” under the commercial auto policy may be a question of fact, Judge Watkins opined. And although Jones wasn’t listed as a scheduled driver, the policy also generally defined “insured” as “anyone else while using, with [the named insured’s] permission, a covered auto.” Based on these broad coverage provisions, the plaintiff argued that there were questions of fact as to whether the commercial auto policy provides coverage for the incident in question. The defendants didn’t address these policy provisions or explain why they fail to provide coverage here, much less offer any affirmative evidence of coverage denial under the policy. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that the defendants failed to meet their initial burden of showing that no other insurance coverage was available to cover the plaintiff’s injuries.
Judge Watkins explained that it wasn’t the Court’s task, at this juncture, to determine whether coverage actually is available under the LLC’s commercial auto policy. The Court held only that the defendants failed to carry their burden of showing that it wasn’t. Therefore, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in their favor based on the limited release. The judgment was reversed. Jackson v. Cantrell, 2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 412 ; 2026 LX 427490; 2026 WL 2423919 (Ga. App. August 19, 2026).
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