How Do You Object to a Jury Instruction on Causation?
In an order granting a plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial, a Chatham County Georgia judge granted the motion after a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
In his order, Chief Judge Gregory V. Sapp stated that the Court exercised its discretion and rejected three of the plaintiff’s arguments; however, the Court accepted the plaintiff’s arguments pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24 (error in instructions) with respect to the failure to properly charge the jury on the burden of proof. As a result, the Court agreed that a new trial was warranted.
Failure to Properly Instruct the Jury
The judge considered the plaintiff’s arguments based on the failure to properly instruct the jury regarding the defendant’s burden of proof. The judge stated that this analysis is guided by O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24, which provides as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Code section, in all civil cases, no party may complain of the giving or the failure to give an instruction to the jury unless he objects thereto before the jury returns its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury. Objection need not be made with the particularity formerly required of assignments of error and need only be as reasonably definite as the circumstances will permit. This subsection shall not apply in criminal cases.
(b) In all cases, at the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may present to the court written requests that it instruct the jury on the law as set forth therein. Copies of requests shall be given to opposing counsel for their consideration prior to the charge of the court. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury but shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed. The trial judge shall file with the clerk all requests submitted to him, whether given in charge or not.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code section, the appellate courts shall consider and review erroneous charges where there has been a substantial error in the charge which was harmful as a matter of law, regardless of whether objection was made hereunder or not.
Pursuant to this law, requests to charge must be made in writing, the judge said. The requesting party must also timely object to the given charges prior to the jury returning its verdict. The grounds for the objection must be stated distinctly, and the objection must be reasonably definite. And even if no objection is made, the court must consider whether the charge given was a substantial error so as to be harmful as a matter of law. Bearing this law in mind, Judge Sapp found that at trial, the parties disputed whether the plaintiff was injured in the collision with the defendant, whether she had pre-existing conditions that caused her pain, and whether she was injured in a subsequent collision. In other words, although the defendant admitted negligence, she specifically disputed causation of the injuries.
While the plaintiff had the burden of proof to establish causation, she argued that the defendant’s defense meant that they now had the burden of proof to establish alternative causation for her injuries. On the other hand, the defendant claimed that the burden never shifted to her to prove anything because she wasn’t asserting an affirmative defense, but instead she was simply arguing that the plaintiff couldn’t meet her burden of proof as to the issue of causation.
Judge Sapp noted that the pre-trial order didn’t expressly state that the defendant’s defense was that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by someone or something else. The defendant further pointed out that it was the plaintiff who introduced evidence regarding both collisions. On the other hand, during her case, the defendant testified that the collision was minor. She also introduced the testimony of an expert orthopedist who testified that the images and records he viewed after the plaintiff’s first collision showed no trauma or injury.
The expert orthopedist further testified that the subsequent wreck was a significant one and appeared to be more traumatic for the plaintiff, although he stopped short of affirmatively stating that the second wreck caused her injuries. But the doctor briefly testify that her pain could be caused by her fibromyalgia. In summary, the defense was that the defendant caused the collision, but the plaintiff didn’t manifest any injury or complain about significant injury until after the second car accident. Therefore, the defendant concluded that the evidence arguably failed to establish that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the first collision.
At the close of this evidence, the plaintiff requested that the judge provide her request to charge the jury as follows:
The Defendant has the burden of proof of proving the facts of any affirmative defenses which she asserts with a preponderance of evidence. This includes proof of any alternative cause of injury, failure to mitigate her loss, apportionment, or any other affirmative defense. Speculation fails to meet this burden.
When this charge wasn’t included in the draft charges provided to the parties for purposes of the charge conference, the plaintiff took exception to this determination.
THE COURT [in the context of discussing other requests to charge regarding causation]: I think all this subsequent event stuff is going to be something for you guys to argue. As opposed to any — I mean, those are — that’s a fact issue. That’s why we’re here, probably — is how the jury views the facts in the case, and whether they believe that her injury — the initial injury was significant and was the cause — was significant and the cause of her subsequent treatment or whether these other incidents were that. So I think that’s given into the bulk of that charge is given in the Court’s charge. Anything else. Mr. Brooks?
- BROOKS: Yes, sir. [Plaintiff’s request to] charge number 13 concerning the Defendant’s burden of proof on affirmative defenses, which is specific in this case to alternate causation of injury and that was December 30, 2018.
THE COURT: Mr. Meyer?
- MEYER: – Judge, we don’t have affirmative defense. This is just like every other case, we’re just poking holes in their case.
THE COURT: Yeah. I would –
- MEYER: It would be different if we were trying to —
THE COURT: What — what’s their affirmative defense, Mr. Brooks? I don’t recall hearing affirmative —
- BROOKS: Well, it’s they — they’re claiming that all the injuries were occurring from the December 30, 2018 incident, as opposed to the…September 26, 2018 injury. I mean, Dr. Spivey just testified that she had been cured before — before the December 30 event, and then — so all of her treatment would have been related to the December 30th event rather than the September 26th event.
THE COURT: – Well, I mean — yeah, but that’s, like, follow-up to the basic argument that she wasn’t hurt in the wreck, right? I mean, that’s the follow-up to the basic argument that she wasn’t [hurt] in the wreck, and that — so any other complaint she has is something else, including these subsequent wrecks. I don’t think it’s an affirmative defense, I think it’s just a proof — a proof argument that the Plaintiff — it’s a rebutting of the Plaintiff’s burden of proof to show that this wreck caused the injures, so…. It’s noted, I’m not going to charge number 13, though, Mr. Brooks. But all these exemptions are noted for the record.
Although the judge found the defendant’s argument at trial more persuasive, he acknowledged that he erred, and that the plaintiff’s argument was a correct statement of Georgia law and it properly applied in this case. Specifically, O.C.G.A. § 24-14-1 provides:
The burden of proof generally lies upon the party who is asserting or affirming a fact and to the existence of whose case or defense the proof of such fact is essential. If a negation or negative affirmation is essential to a party’s case or defense, the proof of such negation or negative affirmation shall lie on the party so affirming it.
Stated differently, it’s well settled that to recover damages in a tort action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her injuries were caused by the defendant’s negligence. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-14-1, a party asserting a fact essential to that party’s case or defense bears the burden of proof as to that fact,” and this includes facts going to alternate theories of causation.
Judge Sapp when on to explain that generally, a defendant raising an affirmative defense admits the essential facts of a plaintiff’s complaint, but then sets up other facts in justification or avoidance, or other special matters not merely elaborating or explaining a general denial, the burden of proving which by a preponderance of the evidence will rest on the defendants. A defendant needn’t necessarily concede the essential facts of the plaintiff’s claim to raise a burden-shifting affirmative defense, however. He or she may deny the essential facts asserted and also claim in the alternative that, if the plaintiff had been injured, the injury was due to causes other than the defendant’s actions. Once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the defendant seeking to establish that someone else bears responsibility for the damages has the burden of proving that defense.
At trial, the plaintiff made a prima facie case with respect to not only negligence, but also damages. While the defendant admitted negligence, she asserted that most if not all of the injuries claimed by the plaintiff were proximately caused by either pre-existing conditions or the subsequent collision. Based on the record, including the evidence presented at trial, the plaintiff correctly argued that the defendant’s causation defense required her to establish certain facts to show alternative causation of the damages at issue. Under Georgia law, the defendant had the burden of proof to establish these alternative facts by the preponderance of the evidence. The substance of the plaintiff’s jury charge was therefore applicable and appropriate.
The judge agreed that it would have been appropriate to charge the jury on the law as stated in O.C.G.A. § 24-14-1, which is close to what was requested. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24(a) and (b) the plaintiff’s objection to the omission of this charge was both timely and legally sufficient. Since her objection was made during the charge conference and before the jury rendered its verdict, it was timely. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24(b), the substance of the objection was also legally sufficient. While the judge gave the appropriate burden of proof charge to the jurors regarding the plaintiff’s obligations to prove her case, he judge that it would’ve been appropriate to give the language in § 24-14-1 since it was applicable to the facts that the defendant was required to prove. Judge Sapp also noted that the defendant’s closing particularly emphasized that the plaintiff had the burden of proof, but that the defendant had no burden of proof to establish anything.
Hence, Judge Sapp agreed that a significant point of law was not covered by its charges, so a new trial was appropriate in light of the evidence and arguments. Accordingly, the judge granted the plaintiff’s request for relief on this basis. Helmuth v. Sherrod, 2024 Ga. State LEXIS 6760 (Chatham Cnty. November 26, 2024).
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